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ORGANIC OR CONTRACT SUPPORT?
INVESTIGATING COST AND PERFORMANCE IN AIRCRAFT SUSTAINMENT
Jonathan D. Ritschel
Air Force Institute of Technology
Tamiko L. Ritschel
HQ Air Force Material Command
ABSTRACT
Over the past 15 years, the United States Air Force (USAF) has shifted toward utilizing more
Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) and away from organic maintenance in their aircraft fleets.
Given operating and support costs comprise 53-65% of total life-cycle costs for USAF aircraft,
understanding the implications of these sustainment decisions is imperative.  Utilizing a maintenance
cost per flying hour metric and performing regression analysis, we find the maintenance strategy
decision (CLS, mixed, or organic) is the most significant driver.  We then examine performance
metrics in relation to two established aircraft availability targets.  Analysis of variance reveals
statistically significant differences between maintenance strategies, with CLS outperforming organic
in relation to the targets.
INTRODUCTION
The decision to vertically integrate capability
into a firm or contract-out for that capability is a
fundamental economic question all large
companies must answer.   The economics
discipline frames a theoretical answer through
the theory of the firm with Ronald Coase’s
contribution in this area undergirding the
literature (Coase, 1937).  After visiting Ford
Motor Company, Coase pondered why certain
activities occurred within the firm (e.g. Ford
built their own steel mills) rather than being
purchased from the market.  His answer
revolutionized economists’ understanding of
why companies are created and the factors that
determine their size and scope.  Coase explains
that there are costs to using the price mechanism
(i.e. markets).  These costs, commonly referred
to as transaction costs, are the costs incurred by
buyers and sellers in making an economic
exchange.  Thus, transaction costs are often the
costs that matter in determining whether or not
to make an activity internal to the firm (Coase,
1937).
The United States Air Force (USAF) is confronted
with this strategic decision for each individual
aircraft platform it owns.  Complicating matters, the
fundamental question of whether to build in-house
or purchase in markets is relevant in all stages of a
product’s life-cycle:  from development to
production to operations and sustainment.
Decisions to use the market for one stage of the life-
cycle do not necessarily lead to the same decision in
a subsequent phase.  For example, production of a
platform may be through the market mechanism,
while sustainment of that same platform may be
organic.  This research focuses solely on the
operations and support phase of the life-cycle for
the USAF fleet of aircraft.  Specifically, the
focus of this paper is on the decision to provide
aircraft maintenance organically or by
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).
While the underlying decision to conduct
maintenance organically or through contracted
support confronts all businesses from Southwest
Airlines to FedEx, the unique aspects of Air
Force aircraft is more clearly understood in the
transaction cost framework detailed by Oliver
Williamson.  Williamson introduces the concept
of “asset specificity” as a determinant of
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transaction costs (Williamson, 1981).  Asset
specificity is the extent to which investments
made to support a particular transaction have a
high value to that specific transaction and are not
easily converted for other uses.  The implication
is a supplier may bid in a competitive
environment for the rights to produce something.
However, once the contract is awarded, the high
degree of asset specificity changes the nature of
the market environment from a competitive
market to a de facto bilateral monopoly (a
bilateral monopoly is defined as one supplier;
the monopolist, and one purchaser; the
monopsonist).  Williamson argues that higher
degrees of asset specificity raise transaction
costs (Williamson, 1981).  Given the unique
nature of Air Force aircraft, it can be argued that
there is high asset specificity in their
maintenance.  For example, the investments in
equipment to maintain composite materials on a
stealth aircraft are unlikely to be easily
converted to commercial aircraft use.
This research analyzes organic maintenance
support in comparison with CLS costs in Air
Force aircraft.  It seeks to determine whether one
maintenance approach is more expensive than
the alternative through regression analysis.
However, considering cost alone removes the
ability to truly assess value.  As assessment of
performance output allows the Air Force to
understand if the dollars they spend produce the
results they need to perform their mission.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) assessment
provides comparisons of performance metrics to
determine statistical differences in maintenance
strategy performance.
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
REVIEW
The life-cycle of USAF aircraft consists of four
stages: research and development, procurement,
operating and support, and disposal.
Historically, researchers have focused on issues
associated with the research and development or
procurement stages of the life cycle.  However,
smaller defense budgets and recent legislation, such
as the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of
2009, has highlighted the importance of total life-
cycle cost analysis.  Subsequent research
determined that operating and support costs for
USAF aircraft consist of 53-65% of the total life-
cycle costs (Jones et al., 2014).  See Figure 1.
With platforms such as the joint strike fighter
projected to cost over $1 trillion for operations and
support, analysis of maintenance strategy decisions
is needed (GAO, 2014).
The Air Force has a continuum of choices when
determining the optimal strategy for maintaining
and sustaining its fleet of aircraft.  See Figure 2.
On one end is the fully vertically integrated
option – referred to as organic maintenance.  Air
Force organic maintenance occurs at three
government run “depots” called Air Logistics
Centers (ALCs)1.  On the other end of the
continuum is the market mechanism, referred to
as Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), where all
maintenance activity is conducted through a
contractual relationship with private industry.  In
between either extremum is a mix of varying
combinations of both organic and CLS
maintenance.
Both organic and CLS maintenance strategies
have benefits.  Organic maintenance provides a
guaranteed source of supply and endows the Air
Force with complete control over when and how
the maintenance is completed (Boito et. al,
2009).  CLS offers the potential for lower costs
due to market competition and possible
economies of scale when the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is also selected
to perform the sustainment function (Boito et. al,
2009).  It is important to understand the Air
Force sustainment strategy decision occurs at the
individual aircraft platform level (e.g. B-2, C-17,
F-22), rather than a single decision for the entire
Air Force enterprise.  These sustainment strategy
decisions originate early in the program life-
cycle with significant long-term operational and
cost implications.
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Historically, public-sector organic depots originated
in the late 1930s and early 1940s to meet the need
for weapon system maintenance as the private
sector was fully utilized in producing new military
equipment.  This paradigm of primarily private
sector military production of equipment and public
sector maintenance of military systems continued
through the Cold War (Heivlin, 1993).   The 1984
National Defense Authorization Act set in motion
legislative activism and a change in the underlying
sustainment strategy of Air Force platforms.  The
98th Congress passed 10 USC 2464 which
mandates a “core logistics capability” be maintained
that is government owned and operated.  The
“core” requirement is intended to ensure sufficient
organic competency and resources for contingency
and other emergency requirements (Solis, 2009).
Subsequent legislation in 10 USC 2466 sets the
limit for the amount of depot-level workload that
can be performed by non-governmental
personnel.  While the initial 1988 legislation
capped non-governmental maintenance at 40
percent, more recent legislation has raised the
threshold to what is now commonly referred to
as the 50/50 rule.  Specifically, the 50/50 rule
stipulates that a maximum of 50 percent of funds
available in a given fiscal year can be used for
contracted maintenance work (10 USC 2466,
2005).
1 Total Air Force aircraft maintenance is comprised of depot, intermediate, and flight line (unit level)
maintenance.  Flight line maintenance is excluded from this analysis.
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In addition to the legislative actions discussed
above, decisions by the Department of Defense
have affected organic aircraft maintenance
capabilities.  Program Budget Decision (PBD)
720 reduced total Air Force end strength
manpower numbers by 40,000 personnel from
2006-2009.  The aircraft maintenance career
field took particularly large reductions with an
approximately 9,000 person reduction (Drew et
al., 2008).  This reduction equates to
approximately 11% of the total aircraft
maintainer manning.
Figure 3 displays the longitudinal trajectories of
total Air Force aircraft by maintenance type.  For
the purposes of this study, aircraft are
categorized as either organic, contractor or
mixed.  Categorization of organic or contractor
occurs when greater than 80 percent of the
dollars are allocated to the specific type.  Any
combination less than 80 percent is categorized
as “mixed.”  There is a clear shift over the last
20 years from an Air Force enterprise
predominately organically maintained to one more
dependent on contracted maintenance.  This trend
leads to two investigative questions.  First, which
maintenance type costs the Air Force more?
Second, which approach provides greater value to
the Air Force?
MODEL DATA
The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC)
database provides operations and support data on
Air Force aircraft platforms dating back to 1996.
The Office of Secretary of Defense, Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation (OSD-CAPE)
office provides broad policy guidance and
executive oversight to the AFTOC system (DoD,
2014).  OSD-CAPE promotes standardization of
operations and support cost data collection
through a published Cost Element Structure
(CES) in its Operating and Support Cost
Estimating Guide.  Cost data for this analysis is
extracted from AFTOC for the period 1996-2014
for those elements related to maintenance as
defined in the OSD-CAPE guidance.  See Table
1 for a list of the aircraft platforms by
maintenance type.
Logistics Installations and Mission Support –
Enterprise View (LIMS-EV), maintained by
Fall/Winter 2016 51
Headquarters Air Force Logistics, provides flying
hour data for each mission design series (MDS) in
the Air Force enterprise.  Flying hour data is
combined with maintenance cost to create a total
maintenance cost per flying hour metric for each
aircraft platform.  This metric is used as the
dependent variable in the regression analysis.
The age of an aircraft can have a significant
effect on maintenance costs.  There are a
multitude of studies examining the age effect
(Kamins (1970), Hildebrandt and Sze (1990),
Kiley (2001)).  Pyles (2003) is the most
comprehensive study completed on Air Force
aircraft aging effects.  Pyles found that late-life
maintenance requirements generally exhibit
increased growth as aircraft age.  Dixon (2006)
tested similar hypotheses as Pyles.  Dixon,
however, differs from Pyles in several ways.
First, Dixon examines real dollars through the
cost per flying hour dependent variable (rather
than man-hours or requirements).  Second,
Dixon utilizes a different dataset as he analyzes
commercial aircraft and then draws inferences for
USAF aging aircraft.  Dixon concludes that while
there are significant aging effects early on, after year
12 the age effect is only 0.7 percent and not
statistically significant from zero (Dixon, 2006).
Data on age of aircraft is also collected from
LIMS-EV.  Figure 4 shows that the average age
of organically maintained aircraft has increased
significantly over the past 15 years.  Thus, age of
aircraft is utilized as a control variable in the
model.
The remaining data, to include Total Active
Inventory (TAI), number of sorties, number of
landings, and availability metrics, is also
collected from LIMS-EV.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The analytic approach seeks to first determine
whether the maintenance strategy chosen (i.e.
organic or CLS) is a driver of total maintenance
costs.  The naïve approach of comparing simple
averages of maintenance costs per flying hour by
maintenance strategy is rejected as other
variables (e.g. technology, age of aircraft, etc.)
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are influential.  Thus, multiple regression is utilized to
answer the first question.
Finding a maintenance strategy to be more
expensive does not, in itself, make it an
undesirable choice.  Instead, the output derived
from the approach must be taken into account.
Thus, the second stage of our research examines
performance metrics.  The literature reveals
Aircraft Availability (AA) as the traditional
performance metric analyzed.  AA is defined as
the mission capable hours divided by the total
hours possessed.  AA has been studied
extensively since it became the cornerstone
metric of internal Air Force logistics fleet
evaluations (Rainey et. al, 2011).  While Air
Force agencies have therefore examined AA and its
predecessor mission capable (MC) rates, we argue
that AA is not the true metric of interest.  The AA
calculation gives a raw availability metric.  But the
real value to the Air Force is in meeting established
targets, not a raw value of the AA metric.
The Air Force tracks two availability targets
called the “standard” and “attainable.”  The
“standard” is aircraft platform unique and
represents the percentage of the aircraft fleet that
is required to be available at any time to meet
mission requirements.  AA Standards are
updated once a year based on the following
formula:
Where  – number of sorties needed to complete
all aircrew contingency operations,  – number of
training mission requirements, - days available
to fly,  – number of days available during the
fiscal year to execute the flying training mission, 
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– turn rate,  – attrition rate,  – ground schedule
requirement,  – spare requirement,  – alert
requirement, and  – reserve requirement (Air
Force Instruction 21-103, 2012)
The “attainable” metric represents the realistic
availability of individual aircraft platforms given
the resources that have been allocated to that
platform.  The proper statistics of interest is
therefore the ratio of AA to Standard and AA to
Attainable, not AA itself.  It answers the question
“which maintenance type hits closer to the
established target?” Deviating below the ratio is
undesirable as aircraft are not available to meet
mission requirements.  On the other hand,
exceeding the ratio is also undesirable as
resources are not being properly allocated.  We
conduct ANOVA analysis to test the mean
differences for each maintenance strategy.
Stage 1: Regression Model
The first investigative question is whether the
maintenance approach (organic or CLS) is a
driver of costs per aircraft tail.  If the approach is
found to be a driver, then we investigate which
maintenance strategy is more expensive.  To
analyze maintenance costs per flying hour, we
relate measures of activity with maintenance
costs over time using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) multiple regression analysis.
The dependent variable is Total Maintenance
Cost per Flying hour for platform i in year j.
The cost data from AFTOC is normalized with
Office of Secretary of Defense inflation indices
to a Base Year 2014 dollar.  The initial
regression model violates the underlying OLS
assumption of homoskedacity (constant
variance).  To correct this, the dependent
variable is transformed with the natural log.
Independent variables are based on a review of the
literature and subject matter experts in the USAF.
An explanation for their inclusion in the model is as
follows:
Age of Aircraft
ij
 – The literature review finds
age of aircraft as a theoretically important
explanatory variable.  Figure 4 demonstrates the
age profile of organically, CLS, and mixed
maintenance strategy as a function of time.  As
the figure indicates, organically maintained
aircraft are older on average than CLS
maintained aircraft and the enterprise as a whole
is getting older.
Platform
i
 – Platform is incorporated as a
fixed effect in the regression model.  It is a
proxy variable for technology.  There are likely
to be significant maintenance cost differences
based on the technology of the aircraft platform.
For example, the sophisticated composite
materials required for the F-22 is significantly
more costly to maintain than the relatively
simple materials of an A-10.
Average Total Active Inventory
ij 
- Economic
theory postulates that there are potential
economies of scales (lower average costs) as the
quantity of aircraft maintained increases.  This
variable controls for this effect.
Year
j 
- Year is modeled as a fixed effect in
the regression model.   It covers 19 years from
1996-2014, with 1996 utilized as the year of
comparison. Even with the data normalized for
inflation, it is still necessary to control for other
year to year changes.
Percent CLS
ij 
– Percent CLS is calculated
using AFTOC data.  It provides the percentage
of the platform that is CLS maintained, where 1
is fully CLS maintained, 0 is fully organically
maintained, and numbers in between represent
the mixture.  This is the crucial independent
variable in the model.  Its significance (or lack
thereof) in the model is the rosetta stone to
answering the first research question concerning
the costs of the maintenance strategies.
Other independent variables were considered in the
model.  These variables included number of
landings, number of sorties and stealth
technology.  Multivariate correlation plots (and
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VIF values) revealed multicollinearity issues
between the Landings, Sorties, and TAI
independent variables.  As a result, the landings
and sorties variables were removed from the
model.  Table 2 summarizes the final set of
independent variables, their attributes, the type
of variable, and the a priori hypothesized sign of
the coefficients.  The hypothesized signs of the
coefficients are theoretical, based upon the
literature review.
The final form of the regression model is the
following:
ln (Cost
ij
/FH
ij
) = β
0
 + β
1
Age
ij
 + β
2
Platform
i
 +
β
3
Total Aircraft Inventory
ij
 + β
4
Year
j
 + β
5
Percent
CLS
ij
 + ε
ij
where β are the coefficients to be estimated, i is
the platform, j is the year, and ε is a standard
residual term.  The initial dataset contained 1111
data points.  A data scrub and Cook’s D analysis
for influential data points resulted in removal of
13 data points for a final model with 1098 valid
data lines.
Next, the models underlying OLS assumptions
of normality, constant variance, and
independence are verified.  Two diagnostics are
utilized to check for normality. First, a histogram
of the studentized residuals is plotted to analyze
the normality assumption with a normal curve
imposed over the histogram.  Second, the
Shapiro-Wilk test is used as a quantitative
diagnostic to evaluate the Goodness of Fit of the
Normal Distribution. The constant variance
assumption is verified with both a visual
examination of the residual by predicted plot and
also through the Breusch-Pagan test.
Model results are displayed in Table 3.  Percent
CLS is found to be highly significant with a
positive coefficient sign.  The interpretation is
that as platforms move toward contracted
logistics maintenance and away from organic
maintenance the costs increase. Additionally,
percent CLS has the highest standard beta
indicating it is the most powerful explanatory
variable.  This is the first key finding of the
research.
Results from other independent variables in the
model provide further insights.  The negative
coefficient on average TAI demonstrates
economies of scale.  As the fleet size increases
the average cost per unit decreases.  These
results are consistent with economic theory.  The
age of aircraft coefficient is positive indicating
that as aircraft age, the sustainment costs
increase.  This empirical finding is consistent
with the aging literature (Pyles, 2003).  Finally,
the platform variable is found to be significant.
Platform is used as a fixed effect in the model
and a proxy for technology.  Thus, technology is
correlated with an increased cost per flying hour.
Stage 2: Performance Analysis
Determining that a maintenance strategy is a
driver of costs does not necessarily mean that
past sustainment decisions were not in the best
interest of the USAF.  The performance achieved
by the various approaches must also be considered.
For USAF aircraft, availability is the primary
performance characteristic associated with
maintenance.   Rather than analyzing raw availability,
we evaluate the maintenance strategy’s ability to
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meet the two USAF specified targets for each
platform.  These targets are the “standard” and the
“attainable”.  As discussed previously, the
“standard” represents the percentage of the aircraft
fleet that is required to be available at any time to
meet mission requirements while the “attainable”
metric is the resource constrained target.  LIMS-EV
contains the unique platform target data for both the
“standard” and “attainable” metrics.  The range of
data, by platform, for the “standard” is 30%-90%
and for the “attainable” is 30%-100%.  It is
malapropos to assess availability in the global sense
as is often the proclivity amongst USAF leaders and
analysts.  Hypothetically, if aircraft “A” has a
standard target of 55% and meets this with an AA
rate of 55%; and aircraft “B” has a standard target
of 75% but fails to meet this with an AA rate of
65%: how does averaging these AA rates to a
global statistic give the USAF any indication
that they are meeting their sustainment goals?
Thus, a better performance parameter is to
evaluate the availability of platforms in relation
to their established targets.  Specifically, we
calculate this performance parameter through two
ratios:
% Aircraft Available
i
/Standard Target %
i
Equation (1)
% Aircraft Available
i
/Attainable Target%
i
Equation (2)
where i represents individual aircraft platforms.
First, data is delineated into three groups:
organic, mixed, and CLS as previously shown in
Table 1.  Next, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
is utilized to compare the confidence intervals
associated with the mean of each maintenance
approach for the metric in Equation 1.  We will
refer to this as the Standard ratio.  ANOVA
analysis demonstrates all three maintenance
types are statistically different from one another
with regard to their ability to meet the Standard
target (see Table 4).  The lack of any overlap in the
95% confidence intervals demonstrates statistical
differences between the organically, mixed, and
CLS maintained groups.  The CLS maintenance
approach provides the greatest performance as it’s
mean of 0.9469 is closest to the ideal of 1.0.  The
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organic approach is the next best and the mixed
approach lags significantly behind either of the other
two.
Similarly, ANOVA analysis is conducted to
compare the confidence intervals associated with
organic, mixed, and CLS aircraft maintenance
for the Attainable metric ratio as delineated in
Equation 2.  See Table 5.  Organic and CLS
aircraft maintenance are found to be statistically
different with regard to their ability to meet
established Attainable targets.  However, the
mixed maintenance group is not statistically
different from either CLS or organic aircraft
maintenance.  The variance of the mixed group
is quite large and may be partly due to the
smaller sample size in this group.  Interestingly,
CLS again provides the highest mean ratio of all
three groups.
Thus, we conclude that in regards to both
standard and attainable ratios, CLS and organic
maintenance strategies are statistically different.
CONCLUSION
There has been a recent shift in USAF aircraft
maintenance strategies away from organic
maintenance and towards CLS aircraft
maintenance.  Program Budget Decision 720,
which reduced the USAF organic maintenance
capability, accelerated the shift from 2006-2009.
One reason for this shift was the theory that CLS
would result in cost savings through increased
competition. The findings of this research indicate
that the policy decision to conduct aircraft
maintenance organically, mixed, or by CLS has
significant implications.  We find that maintenance
strategy is not only a driving factor, but is actually
correlated as the most significant factor in aircraft
maintenance costs.  Thus, the policy decisions on
which maintenance strategy to pursue are extremely
important.
The empirical findings in USAF aircraft
maintenance that CLS costs more than organic
maintenance refutes one of the initial claims
cited in the literature (Boito et al, 2009) that
introducing contractor maintenance should
reduce costs through competition.  While not
definitive, we suggest that the counterbalancing
effect is likely to be asset specificity.  There are
large unique costs to conducting maintenance for
USAF aircraft.  These costs do not transfer
easily to other uses – hence there is a high
degree of asset specificity.  Economic
transaction cost theory would postulate that due
to the large transaction costs associated with
high asset specificity, it would be more
beneficial to provide the service organically
(vertically integrate).  Thus, we suggest the asset
specificity phenomenon outweighs the benefits
of competition.  In this study, CLS is found to be
more expensive than organic maintenance for
USAF aircraft.
Cost, however, is only one side of the coin.  The
value inherent from the outcomes of the
maintenance strategy must also be considered.
Value, for USAF aircraft, manifests itself in
aircraft availability to fly missions.  More
specifically, the penultimate valued performance
is achieving the availability target established for
individual USAF platforms.  Our “standard” and
“attainable” ratios model this value.  The
performance analysis provides several findings.
First, the mixed approach to aircraft
maintenance performs worse than either organic
or CLS.  The mixed standard ratio mean is more
than five percent lower than organic and nine
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percent lower than CLS. Thus, the mixed approach
provides the least amount of performance and
should be employed as a last resort.  Second, CLS
and organic maintenance performance ratios
demonstrate that the two approaches provide
statistically significant performance differences.
CLS average performance outperforms organic by
over three percent for the standard ratio.  The
attainable ratio performance results are more
complicated.  Both organic and CLS achieve, on
average, above the ideal ratio of 1.0.  CLS
maintains a higher mean value than organic for the
attainable ratio.  Recall that the attainable target
takes into account availability of aircraft given
the resources allocated.  This naturally leads
back to PBD 720 and the cutting of maintenance
manpower.  Our attainable ratio performance
analysis shows that when resources are taken
into account, organic can perform very well.
Thus, USAF decision makers should take this
into account when considering future PBD 720
type decisions.
In summary, we have found that the decision to
sustain aircraft organically or through CLS
contracts is the most significant driver behind
USAF operating and support costs per flying
hour.  In addition, given that operating and
support costs account for a historical average of
53-65% of the total aircraft life-cycle costs, the
maintenance strategy decision has profound
effects (Jones et al., 2014).  Assessment of
“standard” ratio calculations via ANOVA reveals
CLS maintenance strategy is providing greater
performance than organic.  Additionally, the
ANOVA reveals both CLS and organic strategies
perform, in the aggregate, above targets for the
“attainable” ratio and that their means are
statistically different.  This indicates the importance
of appropriately resourcing across the enterprise to
achieve necessary mission requirements.
 DISCLAIMER:  The views expressed in this
article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of
the United States Air Force.
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